NIGERIA CUSTOMS’ 24 HOUR CLEARANCE PROMISE: CAN B’ODOGWU DELIVER?

Nigeria’s ambition to reduce cargo clearance to 24 hours is becoming a test of more than technology. It is testing whether the country’s maritime institutions can coordinate their processes, reduce manual intervention and deliver measurable improvements in the cost and predictability of trade.

The Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), under Comptroller General Bashir Adewale Adeniyi, has positioned B’Odogwu, its indigenous digital clearance platform, at the centre of its modernisation programme. The system is intended to streamline transactions, improve transparency, strengthen compliance and accelerate cargo release.

The ambition is clear.

The operational reality, however, is more complex.

Some stakeholders report improvements in digital processing, while others point to manual inspections, disconnected systems, unclear processing timelines and charges that continue to concern importers.

Their experiences raise a central question: can Customs deliver a 24 hour clearance promise when the movement of cargo depends on several institutions, processes and commercial operators working together?

The Promise and the Operational Reality

In October 2026, Customs reiterated its ambition to achieve cargo clearance within 24 hours through B’Odogwu. The Service has also identified integration with the National Single Window as part of its wider digitalisation plans.

During a sensitisation programme, the Service reported progress in bank integration to improve duty payments and support more efficient processing.

The platform’s potential is evident in the experiences of some users. Gerald Mbamalu, drawing on his experience in shipping agency operations, said earlier difficulties associated with ASYCUDA and NICIS II had been eliminated in some areas. Representatives of commercial banks also praised aspects of registration, usability and responses to enquiries.

These accounts matter. They suggest that digitalisation can improve specific interactions between Customs and users. They also provide a counterpoint to criticism of the system, indicating that the experience is not uniform across the trade chain.

But improved digital transactions do not automatically mean that cargo is released faster.

An importer may complete a transaction or obtain a Pre Arrival Assessment Report (PAAR) and still face delays awaiting another agency’s approval, physical examination, payment reconciliation or correction of documentation.

The distinction between processing a transaction and releasing cargo is central to assessing the 24 hour target. A platform can perform well at one stage while delays persist elsewhere.

Princess Vicky Haastrup, chairperson of the Seaport Terminal Operators Association of Nigeria (STOAN), highlighted this concern on 14 October at a town hall on maritime digitalisation organised by the League of Maritime Editors. She criticised continued manual Customs procedures, arguing that physical examinations and human intervention contribute to high port operating costs and longer cargo dwell times.

Haastrup called for adequate high end scanners, effective maintenance, stronger risk assessment and wider automation. She advocated reducing manual examination to below 10 per cent of cargo handled, citing international practices.

Her position raises an important operational question. If terminal operators are investing in technology to improve cargo handling, what is preventing the wider clearance process from achieving comparable efficiency?

Customs must protect government revenue, enforce trade regulations and detect prohibited goods. The objective is not to eliminate necessary inspections, but to make them intelligence led and proportionate. Compliant consignments should move efficiently, while higher risk cargo receives the scrutiny required.

The challenge is to demonstrate that the technology, inspection procedures and decisions surrounding cargo release are working together rather than creating successive points of delay.

Integration, Accountability and the Cost of Delay

The challenge extends beyond Customs.

Chris Adeleke, co-founder of AD Marina, has emphasised interoperability across the cargo chain. His perspective draws attention to a fundamental limitation of digital reform: systems operated by different institutions must exchange information reliably if they are to improve the movement of goods.

Maritime and supply chain consultant Samuel Ebidunmi has stressed the importance of defined processing timelines and consequences when deadlines are missed. Oluwole Oyeniran, a digital engineering leader at Deloitte West Africa, has similarly argued that visibility alone cannot resolve operational problems without clear ownership and action.

These are distinct but connected concerns.

Adeleke’s emphasis is on systems communicating across institutional boundaries.

Ebidunmi’s is on time bound processes and consequences for delay. Oyeniran’s is on accountability for acting on the information digital systems make available.

Together, their perspectives raise a question that extends beyond the performance of B’Odogwu itself: when a cargo transaction stalls, can the responsible institution be identified quickly, and is there a defined process for resolving the delay?

The National Single Window, which entered its initial operational phase in March 2026, is intended to support wider coordination across trade related government processes. The transition of Standards Organisation of Nigeria procedures, including relevant import permits and certification processes, further underscores the importance of integration.

However, digitising individual permits and approvals is only one part of the task. The commercial benefit depends on whether information moves accurately between systems, whether agencies can act on one another’s decisions and whether users can resolve errors without restarting transactions or navigating unclear procedures.

For importers, manufacturers and exporters, the cost of delays is tangible. Cargo may attract storage charges and demurrage. Manufacturers may face interruptions to production schedules while waiting for inputs. Exporters may struggle to meet delivery commitments. Businesses must also account for the working capital tied up in goods that have arrived but cannot yet move into production or distribution.

The National Single Window and B’Odogwu should therefore be assessed not simply by the number of agencies connected or transactions processed, but by their contribution to reducing avoidable delays throughout the cargo clearance chain.

The 4 Per Cent FOB Levy: A Policy Conflict Requiring Clarification

The funding of Customs modernisation has become a point of contention between the need to finance the Service’s operations and concerns about the cost of importing into Nigeria.

Section 18(1)(a) of the Nigeria Customs Service Act 2023 provides for an allocation of not less than 4 per cent of the Free on Board (FOB) value of imports to fund the Service. On 11 February 2025, Customs announced a suspension of implementation to allow stakeholder consultations and a review of its funding arrangements. On 15 September 2025, the Federal Ministry of Finance directed the immediate suspension of the charge. Customs acknowledged that directive on 16 September, stating that it had begun consultations with the supervisory Ministry on alternative funding arrangements.

Yet questions remain about how the suspension has been applied in practice.

Customs’ 2026 revenue projections reportedly included approximately ₦1.266 trillion from the levy. Meanwhile, on 14 October 2026, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) and licensed customs agents raised concerns that the charge continued to appear on the Customs portal despite the Ministry’s suspension directive.

These developments present three distinct positions that should not be conflated.

The Federal Ministry of Finance issued the suspension directive in September 2025 following concerns about the implications of the charge for trade facilitation and economic stability.

The Nigeria Customs Service acknowledged the directive, while the statutory provision remains part of the funding framework established by the 2023 Act. The inclusion of projected receipts from the levy in its reported 2026 revenue estimates raises a further question about how the suspension has been reflected in the Service’s funding plans.

Manufacturers and licensed customs agents, meanwhile, are reporting the practical reality they encounter: the charge reportedly continues to appear on the Customs portal despite the suspension directive.

The critical question is direct: Has the Federal Ministry of Finance’s suspension directive been formally lifted or amended? If not, why does the 4 per cent FOB levy reportedly remain on the Customs portal and feature in Customs’ 2026 revenue projections?

The Nigeria Customs Service and the Federal Ministry of Finance need to clarify whether any subsequent directive or approval has been issued, the legal basis for any current collection, the transactions affected and the arrangements for importers who may have paid the charge.

Customs should explain how its current operational position aligns with the Ministry’s directive. The Ministry, in turn, should confirm the status of its instruction and state whether any revised funding arrangement has been approved.

The distinction matters because a statutory funding provision, a ministerial suspension, a revenue projection and a charge appearing on a digital platform are separate matters. Their relationship must be explained by the institutions responsible, rather than left to importers to interpret.

For manufacturers and importers, uncertainty over the charge affects landed cost calculations, cash flow and business planning. For Customs, sustainable funding is important to maintaining its systems and operations. The resolution must address both the funding question and the need for predictable, transparent charges.

This is not merely a dispute over a levy. It is a test of policy communication, administrative consistency and the confidence businesses can place in the digital processes through which they conduct legitimate trade.

The Wider Port Regulatory Environment

Cargo clearance also operates within a wider institutional framework.

The Nigerian Ports Economic Regulatory Agency (NPERA), led by Director General and Chief Executive Officer Dr Pius Akutah, has responsibilities within the broader port regulatory environment. Those responsibilities should not be confused with the direct management of B’Odogwu, which remains a Customs platform.

However, the wider regulatory framework matters to the objective of making Nigerian ports more efficient. Clear service standards, transparency around operational bottlenecks and coordination among institutions can help identify where delays occur and which authority is responsible for addressing them.

The Nigerian Ports Authority’s modernisation agenda also forms part of the port operating environment, while the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) has maritime safety, security and regulatory responsibilities that affect the wider maritime sector.

These institutions do not perform interchangeable roles. The issue is whether their respective responsibilities, alongside those of Customs, terminal operators, shipping lines, banks and other agencies, are coordinated sufficiently to support predictable cargo movement.

For NPERA, the relevant question is how its regulatory role can support transparent service standards and accountability across the port system without duplicating Customs’ operational mandate.

From Digital Deployment to Measurable Results

Nigeria’s 24 hour clearance ambition requires evidence that digitalisation is improving the complete cargo release process, not just individual transactions.

Customs should publish regular performance data showing median clearance times, the proportion of eligible consignments released within 24 hours, system availability, processing failures and the time taken to resolve them. The data should distinguish delays under Customs control from those attributable to other agencies, traders or terminal operations.

The Service should also establish clear escalation procedures for transactions affected by integration failures. Where a consignment remains uncleared beyond the stated timeline, the responsible agency and reason for the delay should be identifiable. This would allow businesses to understand what is happening and enable policymakers to distinguish technical problems from procedural or institutional bottlenecks.

Terminal operators, banks, manufacturers, shipping lines and licensed customs agents should contribute operational evidence to this assessment. Their experiences can help determine whether reported improvements are translating into lower costs and shorter cargo dwell times.

The National Single Window should likewise be assessed on whether it reduces repeated documentation, improves the exchange of information and helps resolve delays across agency boundaries. Integration is meaningful when it changes the experience of the trader, not merely when systems are connected.

The 24 hour target should ultimately be judged by results rather than announcements. If Nigeria can reduce avoidable delays, apply risk based inspections, resolve system failures quickly and coordinate its digital processes effectively, the benefits will extend beyond the ports to manufacturers, exporters, consumers and the wider economy.

B’Odogwu has the potential to become a significant instrument of Customs modernisation. Its long term credibility, however, will depend on whether businesses experience a genuinely faster, more transparent and more predictable route from documentation to cargo release.

PrimeAxis Insight

Nigeria’s Customs modernisation is taking place at a time when the cost and reliability of moving goods are central to Nigeria's trade competitiveness. The question is not whether digital systems are necessary. They are. The question is whether the institutions operating them can translate technology into a better commercial environment for the businesses that depend on the ports.

The industry voices captured in this debate reveal different dimensions of the same reform.

Adeniyi’s emphasis on sustainable technology funding speaks to the resources required to maintain and improve Customs systems.

Haastrup’s criticism of manual procedures draws attention to the physical processes that can undermine digital gains. Mbamalu’s experience points to improvements in aspects of system performance, while bank representatives have highlighted usability and responsiveness.

Adeleke’s focus on interoperability, Ebidunmi’s insistence on timelines and consequences, and Oyeniran’s emphasis on ownership and action point to what must happen beyond the deployment of a platform. Manufacturers and licensed customs agents bring the discussion back to the commercial reality: the cost, predictability and practical experience of processing imports.

These perspectives should not be treated as competing narratives. They are different measures of the same reform. A digital platform can function effectively within Customs and still fail to deliver the intended economic benefit if another agency’s approval, a disconnected database, a manual inspection or an unresolved payment issue prevents cargo from moving.

Equally, faster processing cannot come at the expense of legitimate revenue collection, border security or regulatory compliance. The objective is a system that protects public interests while allowing compliant trade to move with greater speed and certainty.

The 4 percent FOB levy dispute makes the need for institutional clarity particularly evident. The Ministry of Finance issued a suspension directive.

Customs acknowledged it, while the statutory provision remains part of the funding framework. Manufacturers and clearing agents subsequently reported that the charge remained visible on the Customs portal. Customs’ reported revenue projections add another dimension to the question.

The appropriate response is not to assume that these positions have already been reconciled. It is to ask the institutions responsible to explain them. Has the suspension been formally lifted or amended? If so, when, by whom and under what authority? If it remains in force, why does the charge reportedly continue to appear on the portal, and how has the directive been reflected in Customs’ revenue planning? What should importers do if they have been charged, and what arrangements exist for correcting payments made contrary to the applicable directive?

These questions deserve direct answers from the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Nigeria Customs Service. They affect not only the levy but also confidence in the rules governing digital trade.

Nigeria also needs a common performance framework for cargo clearance. Customs should report the time consignments spend under its control, while other agencies should account for their own processing stages. The National Single Window should be assessed on whether it connects these stages in practice. NPERA’s regulatory role can support the wider objective through transparent service standards and visibility into persistent operational constraints.

Ultimately, the 24 hour clearance ambition should be measured against the experience of the trader whose documents are complete, the manufacturer waiting for production inputs, the exporter working to meet a delivery deadline and the shipping and terminal operators whose costs rise when cargo remains in the system.

Their experience is where institutional performance becomes economic reality.

B’Odogwu can contribute meaningfully to that outcome, but it cannot deliver it alone. The gains will depend on reliable technology, risk based inspection, connected systems, accountable institutions and a funding framework that businesses can understand and plan around.

For Nigeria, the real test of Customs modernisation is whether it can protect public revenue while making legitimate trade faster, more predictable and less expensive. That is the standard against which the reform should be judged.